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Helmet-mounted cameras 
provide recordings that provide 
an opportunity for scientific and 
applied researchers to study 
fireground command and control.
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M ore and more often, helmet-mounted cameras are used by fire services in the Netherlands to provide fireground commanders a better insight into their 
command and control skills. Battalion chiefs in particular use 
helmet-mounted cameras during both exercises and real-life 
situations to get a better understanding of how they act and 
what firefighters do on the fireground. These video-recordings 
are not only valuable for training purposes, but also provide a 
genuine opportunity for scientific and applied researchers to 
study fireground command and control. 
In this article we discuss the application of helmet-mounted 
cameras in research, training and operational practice in the 
Netherlands and point to the opportunities and challenges for 
research and fireground command and control training and 
practice. 
Fireground decisions
Fireground command and control can be defined as making 
decisions about the fireground operation and ensuring that 
subordinates at the front line will properly carry out those deci-
sions. To do this, fireground commanders need to gather and 
analyse information about the situation and their resources, 
make decisions about the fireground operation, communicate 
orders and monitor the implementation of those orders. 
In the past few decades, considerable scientific attention has 
been devoted to fireground decision making, which is a major 
aspect of fireground command and control (e.g., Klein, 2008; 
Tissington, 2001). Probably the best-known example within 
the firefighter community is Klein’s Recognition Primed Deci-
sion Making (RPD) Model, which states that decision-makers 
use their experience to make a satisfactory decision under time 
pressure and uncertainty. This research has provided much 
insight into the way fireground commanders arrive at decisions 
under demanding circumstances, but is neither sufficient for 
understanding how these decisions are transformed into orders 
nor how these orders are communicated and monitored (c.f. 
Groenendaal et al. 2013). As a consequence, from a scientific 
viewpoint little is known about the effect of fireground com-
mand and control on fireground operations. 
A first step toward understanding the effect of fireground 
command and control is to examine what fireground com-
manders actually do when they are in command, and how they 
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do it. Mintzberg (2009), in his seminal studies on 
general management, has showed us how impor-
tant it is for theoretical development of manage-
ment, as well as the progression of evidence-based 
management practice, to demythologize the work 
of managers in public and private sector by system-
atically unravelling what managers actually do in 
practice and how they do it. A major limitation of 
the current research on fireground command and 
control, and particularly decision making, is that 
it is based on retrospective (subjective) accounts of 
fireground commanders. Gary Klein’s RPD model, 
for example, is primarily based on interviews with 
crew commanders and battalion chiefs. Likely due 
to practical barriers, observational research on fire-
ground command is still rather limited (Nja and 
Rake, 2008; Groenendaal et al. 2013). 
researcHing Fireground  
coMMand & control
When relying on the perceptions of fireground com-
manders, researchers face significant methodological 
challenges, such as self-justification, hindsight bias, 
blame, incomplete recollection and remoteness in 
time. In providing self-reports, decision makers tend 
to present an image of the self that is self-enhancing 
and self-consistent, resulting in distortion and cen-
soring of data (Omodei et al. 2002). Video record-
ings taken from a commander-point-of-view provide 
a more reliable and rich interpretative insight into 
the working world of fireground commanders (see 
for example Lipshitz et al. 2007). First, it becomes 
possible to objectively determine what fireground 
commanders do for three of the five stages of the 
command and control process: 1) information gath-
ering, 2) communicating about decisions, and 3) 
monitoring decision implementation. What kind 
of information do they get from their environment? 
What kind of information do they actively gather? 
Do they conduct a 360-degree size-up, and if so, 
what do they look at? How many and what kind of 
decisions do they communicate? Do they monitor 
the implementation of decisions? How? How many 
orders are correctly carried out by subordinates? And 
if they notice, what do they do when decisions are 
not carried out? With whom do they talk? How 
much time is spent on monodisciplinary (fire service 
staff only) versus multidisciplinary (diverse emer-
gency services) on-scene consultations? 
These questions are currently under investigation 
in the Netherlands with the use of helmet-mounted 
cameras. In his PhD candidate research, author 
Groenendaal had battalion chiefs throughout the 
Netherlands equipped with GoPro HD or VholdR 
Contour helmet cameras. On a voluntary basis, the 
battalion chiefs record their performance during 
exercises and real life situations. The video record-
ings are then turned in and systematically analysed 
using the questions stated previously, in addition to 
others. This analysis may then yield findings which 
can be used for fireground command education and 
training purposes. 
For instance, to what extent do fireground com-
manders actually exercise control over the fire-
ground operation? Do fireground commanders 
primarily respond to incoming information or do 
they act based upon information they deliberately 
seek? Is the way orders are communicated and 
monitored related to the degree to which orders 
are carried out? To what extent do fireground com-
manders behave differently in exercises and real-life 
situations? And so on. 
Helmet-mounted cameras 
can be powerful tools to 
assist in better learning 
from experience, particu-
larly because they provide 
fireground commanders with 
accurate feedback.
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Finding tHe ansWers
Answering these questions is not only important for 
improving fireground command and control skills, 
but also for enhancing the organizational environ-
ment in which fireground commanders operate. Cur-
rently in the Netherlands, a large-scale research project 
led by the National Fire Academy is being conducted 
to discover what organizational structure is best suited 
for fireground commanders in different task environ-
ments, ranging from simple to difficult and complex. 
Research on which helmet-mounted cameras are 
used has helped support (a) a better understanding of 
recurring problems in the organization of large-scale 
fireground operations, and (b) the formulation of an 
initial hypothesis for improvement. 
Furthermore, when the video recordings are dis-
cussed with the fireground commander (sometimes 
referred to as video-cued reflective interview) after-
wards, the “objective” data obtained from the video 
recordings can be supplemented with perceptions 
about performance and commanders’ intentions. This 
may yield interesting results regarding the differences 
and similarities between the video recordings and per-
ceptions of reality. 
learning FroM experience 
Helmet-mounted cameras provide genuine oppor-
tunities to improve the learning effectiveness and 
efficiency of exercises and real life incidents. But 
research has shown that mere experience itself does 
not necessarily produce higher levels of expertise. 
Gary Klein points to the work of Serfaty, et al. 
(1997), who found clear expert-novice differences 
in the quality, level of detail and flexibility of the 
courses of action generated. However, high per-
formance was not correlated with years of experi-
ence, nor it was correlated with rank. According to 
Klein, this finding indicates that experts, more so 
than their equally experienced counterparts, may 
make better use of their experience. 
We have found that helmet-mounted cameras 
can be powerful tools to assist in better learning 
from experience, particularly because they provide 
fireground commanders with accurate feedback. 
The fireground is typically an environment in 
which feedback is often either missing or mislead-
ing (that is false or delayed). Additionally, for fire-
ground commanders it is often difficult to process 
and make sense of the feedback they get during 
their response due to high time constraints (cf. 
Gonzalez, 2005). Furthermore, in our research we 
found that fireground commanders have difficulty 
remembering the decisions they made at differ-
ent moments in time, the information they had 
available during these moments, and the exact way 
in which they provided orders to subordinates. 
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Rather, we found that fireground commanders 
make sense of the past by organizing bits of mem-
ories in the form of a coherent story of what logi-
cally should have happened, not particularly what 
actually happened. 
For example, in our research a battalion chief, 
reporting about a large fire in the compartment 
of a garbage truck in the inner city of Amster-
dam, told us that he had decided to call for an 
additional fire engine equipped with special foam. 
When he arrived on scene, he told us that he saw 
it would be hard to reach the fire, so he invented 
an alternative solution: He suggested towing the 
garbage truck to an industrial site where the truck 
could be disassembled to better reach the fire. 
However, the video recording showed us that after 
the fireground commander arrived at the scene of 
the event, it was other firefighters who came up 
with the idea to tow away the garbage truck. In 
reality, the fireground commander waited at least 
ten minutes for the fire engine with special foam 
to arrive before he changed his mind and decided 
to tow away the truck. This example shows that 
memory can be distorted, but also that fireground 
command effectiveness is a product of input from 
all firefighters involved, regardless of rank and 
seniority. 
Some fire services in the Netherlands currently 
use video recordings from a helmet-mounted 
camera (hence from the fireground commanders’ 
point of view) during the evaluation of training 
exercises. These video recordings are used to pres-
ent fireground commanders with a clear picture of 
their behavior during the most critical moments 
of the incident. These moments can be selected by 
the trainer or fireground commander. As there is 
often no best way to handle incidents, the aim of 
the “video-cued reflective interview” is not simply 
to show what went wrong, but rather to encourage 
fireground commanders to reflect on what they 
see on the video-recordings. In a dialogue between 
fireground commander and trainer, the video-
recordings can be used to sharpen one’s perceptions 
about past events and raise self-knowledge. Though 
it can be intimidating, many fireground command-
ers are very positive about seeing themselves acting 
in a way they’ve never seen before, showing behavior 
they were never aware of. 
situational aWareness  
& decision-Making 
Increasingly, fire services in the Netherlands use 
cameras to improve the situational awareness and 
decision-making of fireground commanders and 
operational teams. In the Amsterdam-Amstelland 
Fire Service, for instance, new vehicles for battalion 
chiefs are equipped with a camera mounted between 
the sirens on top of the vehicle. The camera can be 
controlled from all over the world as it has its own 
Internet connection and hence can be used by opera-
tional command teams located at a distance to watch 
what is going on at the fireground. In theory, this 
may improve situational awareness of higher echelon 
decision makers as it provides direct perpetual access 
to the scene of the event, an essential element to be 
able to make effective decision.
In addition, multiple fire services are experiment-
ing with drones. Drones are particularly used dur-
ing fires in large-scale or complex buildings or in 
the case of wild fires. Though the initial experiences 
are promising, it should be noted that the effective-
ness of this and other camera applications aimed at 
improving operational decision making has not been 
proven by scientific research. 
cHallenges
Using helmet-mounted cameras for research and 
training purposes is a recent development and chal-
lenges have to be overcome. In the first place, the use 
of helmet-mounted cameras during exercises and in 
real life is not mandatory but is based on voluntary 
cooperation. Interestingly, helmet-mounted cameras 
are particularly used on a voluntary basis by experi-
enced battalion chiefs. Inexperienced chiefs seem to 
be reluctant to use cameras, possibly because they are 
worried that video-recordings will bring errors to the 
surface. This concern should not be underestimated. 
In the worst case, video recordings can be used in 
a lawsuit against fireground commanders. However, 
we live in a society in which there are cameras all over 
the place. The electronic equipment we use stores all 
actions we do and can also be easily misinterpreted. 
In that sense, helmet mounted cameras can also be 
used in favour of fireground commanders by show-
ing what they actually did and on what grounds. 
Using helmet-mounted cameras necessitates sup-
port from senior management. It is important that 
A successful introduction of 
helmet-cameras depends on 
a few ambassadors who are 
willing to show their video-
recordings and demonstrate 
how they benefit from it.
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senior officers in the fire service encourage the use 
of helmet-mounted cameras. They should make 
explicit that video recordings serve as a learning tool 
and will not be used in official job evaluation con-
servations. And they should inform other services, 
including police and EMS, that helmet-cameras are 
used for learning purposes. 
Finally, a successful introduction of helmet-cam-
eras depends on a few ambassadors who are willing 
to show their video-recordings to other fireground 
commanders in the fire service and demonstrate how 
they benefit from it and how it can help others to 
become a better fireground commander. 
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